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NOTE
AMERICAN TAXPAYERS BEAR THE BURDEN OF
BEATING IRAQ IN THE COURTROOM
I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, the unthinkable happened. Two hijacked
airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City
("WTC"), another into part of the Pentagon, and a fourth plane went
down in a field in Pennsylvania.' Before the smoke even cleared,
President Bush vowed to find the perpetrators who committed these
horrific acts and to punish them.2 Shortly after, Osama bin Laden and al
Qaeda were linked to the terrorist attacks, and questions began to
circulate regarding the culpability of Iraq.3 The war against terrorism had
officially begun.
We would soon find out that the war against terrorism was not only
going to be fought in the caves of Afghanistan and the deserts of Iraq,4
but also in the courtrooms of the United States. After getting over the
initial shock of the events that took place on September 1 th, one could
not help but think of the amount of lawsuits that would be brought as a
1. See Paul Moses, Hijacked Planes Hit WTC and Pentagon, NEWSDAY (Nassau), Sept. 12,
2001, at W2. Hereinafter these events will be referred to as "September 11 th" or the "terrorist
attacks."
I. See
President Urges Readiness and
Patience (Sept.
15,
2001),
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915-4.html
(remarks by the President,
Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Attorney General John Ashcroft).
3. See Mohamad Bazzi, Bin Laden Responsible?, NEWSDAY (Nassau), Sept. 12, 2001, at
W14; Rowan Scarborough, U.S. Seeks al Qaeda Link to Iraq, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at Al.
4. On March 19, 2003, the United States began the long awaited war against Iraq. See
President
Bush
Addresses
the
Nation
(Mar.
19,
2003),
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newvs/releases/2003/03/20030319-17;Ken Fireman, U.S. Begins War on
Iraq, NEWSDAY (Nassau), Mar. 20, 2003, at A3. The war against Iraq, referred to as "Operation
Iraqi Freedom," is part of a larger war waged against terrorism since the tragic events of September
11, 2001. See Craig Gordon, Ground Troops Storm into Iraq,NEWSDAY (Nassau), Mar. 21, 2003, at
3;
President
Bush
Outlines
Iraqi
Threat
(Oct.
7,
2002),
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/lO/20021007-8.Meanwhile, on the home front,
victims of September 11th launched a different kind of war against Iraq, a legal war. Instead of
fighting terrorism on the battlefield, these victims chose the courtroom.
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result.5 How would the victims of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon,
and the passengers on the four jet planes be compensated? Not to forget
the firefighters, police officers, and other emergency rescue workers
who were injured or lost their lives as a result of the attacks. Numerous
choices for defendants were discussed, ranging from the obvious, the
terrorists on the four hijacked airplanes, to the not so obvious, the
owners of the World Trade Center. Amongst the list of plausible
defendants were the rogue states that supported these terrorist attacks on
the United States.
Congress took this all into consideration, and very soon after the
attacks, legislation was working its way through Congress that would
make it easier for victims of September 11 th to seek enforcement of
judgments entered against state sponsors of terrorism. The victims of
terrorism should not be denied enforcement of their valid court
judgments. However, if these judgments are enforced, the passage of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ("TRIA") will have profound
ramifications on the American taxpayer in paying these judgments. This
is especially true in light of the civil suit filed against Iraq and the high
probability of an outrageous judgment being entered against the country.
Part II of this Note briefly discusses the wide array of lawsuits that
we are faced with after September 11th, along with a list of the
defendants and an analysis of the possible outcomes in each situation.
To better understand the issue addressed in this Note, Part III discusses a
1996 law allowing for civil claims against governments designated by
our State Department as sponsors of terror. Part IV discusses the prior
judgments entered under the terrorism exception. Part V discusses the
difficulties victims faced when it came to collecting their judgments in
those cases. Part VI of this Note examines the civil suit brought in the
U.S. District Court of Manhattan against Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda,
and Iraq, and focuses specifically on the issue of Iraq as a defendant.
Part VII discusses the post-September 1 th legislation intended to make
it easier for victims to collect judgments against state sponsors of
terrorism, the ramifications this new legislation will have on the

5. On September 12, 2001, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America requested a
moratorium on litigation connected to the attacks that occurred the day before. See Bob Van Voris,
A

Commitment

to

Victims

of

Attacks,

NAT'L

L.J.

(Jan.

7,

2002),

at

http://www.nlj.com/staging/specialIO1O702pb-atla.shtml.
Alan J. Schnurman, a partner at Zalman &
Schnurman, stated: "The litigation that is going to arise out of this terrorist attack is enormous."
Tom Perrotta et al., Litigation Expected in Attack's Aftermath, 226 N.Y.L.J. I (Sept. 17, 2001); see
also Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1265, 1266-67
(2002) (discussing the possible lawsuits following September I Ith).
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American taxpayers as a result of beating Iraq in the courtroom, and how
this injustice should be resolved.
II.

WHO TO SUE?

In the aftermath of September 11 th, one could not help but think of
the possibilities for legal recourse. Franklin F. Bass, a partner at Wilson,
Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, stated: "the disaster is certain to
spur plaintiffs' lawyers to file 'thousands of unique and innovative suits
aimed at any defendant that could possibly provide compensation to
their clients.' ' 6 Indeed, a complicated range of lawsuits has been filed,
and there will be more to come in the future. The question is: Who
would be the defendants in these suits? The following is a list of possible
defendants broken into four categories:
1)American Airlines and United Airlines, as well as the companies
charged with airline security; 2) owners, operators of the buildings;
WTC security personnel; the City and Port Authority; the architects
and contractors who designed and built the WTC; and other similar
defendants (WTC defendants); 3) Osama bin Laden and other
individuals, entities, or states responsible for the attacks; and
4) various governmental entities.7
In examining the scenarios where the above listed are defendants,
the following outcomes are likely:
With respect to the first set of defendants, there would be no
problems obtaining jurisdiction or enforcing judgments. However,
given that those who hijacked the jets brought no illegal objects
aboard, determining the liability of the airlines could be somewhat
problematic. Of course, various theories of negligence could be
advanced, but the case for liability is arguably not as strong as in the
case of Pan Am Flight 103, the Lockerbie crash case, where terrorists
smuggled a bomb aboard the jet. And, despite the sympathy factor, it is
arguable that jurors would be less likely to find the airlines culpable.
With respect to the WTC defendants, there are some indications
that some WTC security personnel told the workers in the second
tower that they should go back to their offices. Otherwise, their degree
of culpability appears to be somewhat tenuous as well.

6. Perrotta et al., supra note 5, at I.
7. Vairo, supra note 5, at 1269; see S. Foster, An American Inquiry into Contemporary
Terrorist Accountability, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 513, 518-25 (2002) (discussing the airlines and
terrorists as possible defendants in suits arising from the events of September 1Ith).
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The terrorists, of course, are obviously substantively liable, but how
will personal jurisdiction be obtained and judgments enforced? With
respect to governmental entities such as the city of New York, the state
and federal government, and their agencies, to what extent will
sovereign immunity preclude recovery by those injured? These
questions just scratch the surface.8

Although there are numerous possibilities for defendants, the real
problem is collecting the judgment.
III.

THE RIGHT TO SUE A COUNTRY

The right to sue a country is a fairly new concept. For most of its
history, the United States has respected the international legal principle
of sovereign immunity.9 Sovereign immunity is the principle whereby
foreign states may not be sued in other countries' courts for their public
acts. 0' At first, the concept of sovereign immunity was absolute;
however, over time, the U.S. courts adopted the "restrictive theory" of
sovereign immunity." "Under this theory, immunity is confined to those
acts which involve a foreign state's public acts, or jure imperii, and does
not extend immunity to suits based upon a state's commercial or private
acts, or jure gestionis."'' 2 The U.S. courts found the restrictive theory
difficult to apply and as a result, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act ("FSIA") in 1976."3

8. Vairo, supra note 5, at 1270 (footnotes omitted).
9. See Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, II U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (extending almost absolute
sovereign immunity to foreign states). Sovereign immunity has enjoyed a long history in the United
States, dating back as early as 1812, when this principle was first recognized in the landmark case of
Schooner Exchange v.M'Faddon. See id.
10. See Margot C. Wuebbels, Note, Commercial Terrorism:A Commercial Activity Exception
Under § 1605(a)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 35 ARIz. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (1993).
11. See id. at 1125; Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1998)
(discussing the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States); Leslie McKay, Note,
A New Take on Antiterrorism: Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 13 AM. U.
INT'LL. REV. 439, 445 (1997).
12. Wuebbels, supra note 10, at 1125. This new approach was more practical considering the
growing involvement of governments, directly or indirectly, in traditionally private matters. See id.
13. See id. at 1126; see also Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under the
FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of InternationalLaw,
77 CAL. L. REV. 365, 370 (1989) (stating the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") was
intended to set forth clearer standards for resolving immunity questions and "to transfer
determinations of sovereign immunity from the State Department to the courts, freeing the
executive branch from case-by-case diplomatic pressures and relieving due process concerns about
the State Department's ability to bind the courts").
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A.

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

The FSIA established the framework for resolving claims of
immunity in any civil action against a foreign state. 4 The statute
provides the "sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving
questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before federal
and state courts in the United States and preempts any other state or
federal law."' 5 The FSIA is based on the premise that "a foreign state is
presumed to be immune from suit, and is in fact immune unless one or
more of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in the FSIA apply."' 6
Previous to the enactment of the 1996 amendments, the FSIA did
not list an exception for torts violating international law 7 and therefore
"a United States citizen could not maintain a viable claim for injuries,
caused by terrorists, against the foreign state which sponsored or
promoted the terrorist act."' 8 This presented a serious obstacle to citizens
attempting to hold a foreign state liable for its actions.' 9 If the plaintiffs'
claim did not fall into one of the specified exceptions to immunity, the
foreign state escaped all legal responsibility for its actions.
During this period,
the exceptions to immunity were limited to when a defendant state
voluntarily consents to defend a suit, when a defendant foreign state
acts primarily in the pursuit of commercial interests, and when
noncommercial tortious acts are committed within the United States by
21
officials or other agents of the defendant foreign state.

14. See Belsky et al., supra note 13, at 370; Wuebbels, supra note 10, at 1126; Walter W.
Heiser, Civil Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of International Terrorism, 3 SAN
DIEGO INT'L L.J. 1,* 14 (2002).
15. Wuebbels, supra note 10, at 1126; see David Zaslowsky, Suing Foreign Governments:
Who will Payfor the World Trade Center Attack?, at http://www.legamedia.net/legapractice/bakermckenzie/2OO2/O2-03/0203_zaslows (last visited Mar. 22, 2003). In 1989, the Supreme Court
confirmed that the FSIA constitutes "the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in
federal court." Argentina Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
16. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2000) (citations omitted); see
Belsky et al., supra note 13, at 370 ("As a general framework, the FSIA starts from a presumption
that states are immune and then creates exceptions to that rule.").
17. See Belsky et al., supra note 13, at 370; McKay, supra note 11, at 447.
18. Richard T. Micco, Note, Putting the Terrorist-Sponsoring State in the Dock: Recent
Changes in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Individual's Recourse Against Foreign
Powers, 14 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 109, 110 (2000).
19. See Belsky etal., supra note 13, at 370 (discussing the limitations of the FSIA before the
1996 amendment).
20. See id.
21. Micco, supra note 18, at I11.
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Not surprisingly, states that sponsor or promote terrorism targeted at
U.S. citizens are unlikely to voluntarily consent to jurisdiction in
American courts. 22 As a result, "in order to bring suits for harm resulting
from foreign state-sponsored terrorism, plaintiffs have attempted to
characterize terrorist acts as a form of commercial activity., 23 Courts
have rejected this argument holding that terrorist acts do not fall within
the bounds of "commercial activity" according to the guidelines of the
FSIA.24 Thus, in the absence of a mechanism providing subject matter
jurisdiction over the acts of a terrorist sponsoring state, in the past, the
United States courts have "dismissed such cases as Cicippio v. Islamic
Republic of Iran and Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya,holding that terrorist-sponsoring states were immune from
suit under the FSIA."25 The 1996 changes to the 1976 FSIA permit U.S.
citizens to bring
civil suits against countries on the State Departments
26
list.
terrorism
B. Antiterrorismand Effective Death Penalty Act
In 1988, when Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie,
Scotland, the FSIA prevented the victims' families from suing Libya, the
terrorist sponsoring state." As an alternative, the families of the victims
killed in the bombing sued the airline and were awarded $500 million,
forcing the airline into bankruptcy.28 In response to the Pan Am 103
bombing, as well as the Oklahoma City bombing, and the World Trade
Center bombing of 1993, the FSIA has since been amended
by the
29
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See id. at lI1-12.
25. Id. at 112.
26. Section 1605(a)(7) denies immunity to a foreign state that is designated as a state sponsor
of terrorism pursuant to § 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)
(2000); see also Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffery Atik, Politics and PersonalJurisdiction:Suing State
Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87
GEO. L.J. 675,675-76 (1999).

27. See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 1996)
("We hold that the FSIA, prior to the recent amendment, does not subject Libya to the jurisdiction
of the District Court with respect to the bombing."); Foster, supra note 7, at 520.
28. See Foster, supra note 7, at 520.
29. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA] (codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 1605); Molora
Vadnais, Comment, The Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Forward
Leaning Legislation or Just Bad Law?, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 199, 217 (2000)
("When Congress passed the terrorism exception, it was justifiably angry and frustrated at the
vicious attacks on U.S. citizens both at home and abroad, as well as attacks on foreign citizens.").
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The AEDPA was passed by Congress in 1996 and included a state
sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA, which amended the FSIA by
adding what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). 5 The terrorism exception
was formulated to achieve three main objectives: "to deter international
terrorism, to allow the families of the victims of terrorism to sue state
sponsors of terrorism for damages, and to punish those states that
support terrorism."3 Under this new section, "Congress lifted the
immunity of foreign states for a certain category of sovereign acts which
are repugnant to the United States and the international communityterrorism. 32 For example, now the FSIA allows victims to bring civil
suits against certain foreign states that have been designated as state
sponsors of terrorism, that are involved in hostage taking, aircraft
sabotage, and other terrorist acts.3
Pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Secretary of
State has the power to designate foreign nations as "state sponsors of
terrorism. '34 Currently, there are seven countries on the State
Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.3" According to the statute, the foreign
state must be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the
act took place.36 For example, terrorist victims could pursue damages
against Iraq because it is one of the designated foreign nations.37
The AEDPA created significant changes, but it failed to "provide a
specific cause of action for victims of state sponsored terrorism."3 To
correct this problem "a separate piece of legislation was enacted to fill
the void."3 9 The amendment, the Civil Liability for Acts of State

30. See Vadnais, supra note 29, at 200; see also Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d
38, 43 (D.D.C. 2000) (stating Congress enacted the AEDPA "for the purpose of holding rogue states
accountable for acts of terrorism perpetrated on United States citizens").
31. Vadnais, supra note 29, at 200, 216-17 (stating the reasons why Congress created the
terrorism exception).
32. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1998) ("That Act created
an exception to the immunity of those foreign states officially designated by the Department of State
as terrorist states if the foreign state commits a terrorist act, or provides material support and
resources to an individual or entity which commits such an act, which results in the death or
personal injury of a United States citizen.") (citation omitted).
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000).
34. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j)(1) (2000).
35. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2002).
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A).
37. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201.
38. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 n.1(D.D.C. 2000).
39. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 6

HOFSTRA IA W REVIEW

[Vol. 31:819

Sponsored Terrorism, is also referred to as the "Flatow Amendment., 40
The amendment allows a plaintiff to seek punitive damages against a
state sponsor of terrorism.
IV.

JUDGMENTS ENTERED UNDER THE TERRORISM EXCEPTION

Since the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), several civil suits
have been filed under the exception against Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya.42
However, thus far, judgments have only been entered against Cuba, Iran,
and Iraq. This section will focus on those cases in which monetary
judgments were entered against state sponsors of terrorism. In the
following cases, prevailing in court and being awarded a judgment in the
hundreds of millions of dollars was not the problem. The difficult part
was collecting the judgment.
A.

Cuba as a Defendant

Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba43 was the first case tried under the
terrorism exception." In addition, this is the only judgment entered
against Cuba to date. The lawsuit was brought after the Cuban Air Force
shot down two unarmed civilian aircrafts over international waters on
February 24, 1996. 4' The pilots were on a routine mission for a
humanitarian group called "Brothers to the Rescue" where they would
fly over "the waters between Cuba and the Florida Keys" looking for
Cuban refugees, also known as rafters.46 The personal representatives for
40. See id.; see also Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1998)
(discussing extensively the Flatow Amendment),
41. See Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 12; see also Micco, supra note 18, at 112. "Following these
amendments, such cases as Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran and
the second Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Cicippio 11) have been extremely successful in
gamering huge damage awards because of these defendant states' financial, material and logistic
support of intemational terrorist organizations." Id. (citations omitted).
42. At the moment, several lawsuits are pending against Libya, but no final judgments have
been entered thus far. See, e.g., Simpson v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 180 F. Supp.
2d 78 (D.D.C. 2001) (regarding a lawsuit brought under the AEDPA against Libya for the hostage
taking and torture of a husband and wife); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 110
F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2000) (regarding a lawsuit brought under the AEDPA against Libya for the
hostage taking and torture of two U.S. citizens); Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998) (regarding a lawsuit brought under the AEDPA against Libya on behalf
of the victims of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (D.D.C. 1996) (regarding a lawsuit brought under the AEDPA against
Libya on behalf of the victims of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103).
43. 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
44. See id. at 1242.
45. See id.
46. Id.
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three of the deceased victims chose to file suit against Cuba and the
Cuban Air Force under the terrorism exception .
Cuba, by means of a diplomatic note, responded that "this Court
has no jurisdiction over Cuba or its political subdivisions. ' ' However,
the court rejected this contention, holding that the terrorism exception
prevented Cuba from asserting foreign sovereign immunity because "the
facts of this case fall squarely within the requirements of section
1605(a)(7).' '49 Because Cuba presented no defense besides its diplomatic
note, the plaintiffs only needed to demonstrate facts sufficient to support
the complaint. 0 The court concluded that this case was "precisely the
type of action for which Congress meant to provide redress by
stripping
'5
terrorist states of immunity from the judgment of U.S. courts. '
The court awarded compensatory damages against Cuba and the
Cuban Air Force equaling about $50 million.52 Punitive damages,
reaching over $137 million, were awarded to the plaintiffs against the
Cuban Air Force. 3
B. Iran as a Defendant
To date, sixteen multi-million dollar judgments have been entered
against Iran under the terrorism exception. In all of the cases, Iran failed
to make a court appearance. However, before the court may enter a
judgment by default in a specific monetary amount against the
defendant, the FSIA mandates that the plaintiff "establishes his claim or
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court."54 In each of the
sixteen cases against Iran, the plaintiffs were able to do so, thereby
leaving the courts free to enter substantial default judgments against the

47. See id. The family of the fourth victim was excluded from participating in this lawsuit
because their loved one was not a United States citizen. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1248. The plaintiffs sued Cuba, a country designated as a state sponsor of terrorism,
for an extrajudicial killing of U.S. nationals that occurred outside Cuba's borders. See id.
50. See id. at 1242.
51. Id. at 1248.
52. See id. at 1253.
53. See id. In discussing damages, the court notes: "[T]he Cuban Air Force is liable for both
compensatory and punitive damages. Under the theory of respondeat superior, Cuba is liable for the
same amount of damages as its agent, with the exception of punitive damages, which the FSIA
prohibits against foreign states." Id. at 1249. The court refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1606. See id. at 1249
n.8.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2000).
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state sponsor of terrorism." A select few of the cases entered against Iran
under the terrorism exception are discussed below.
1. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran
The most famous of the cases is Flatow v. Islamic Republic of
Iran.16 In 1995, Alisa Flatow, a twenty-year-old student from Brandeis
University, was killed by a suicide bomber while traveling in Israel.57 In
response, the victim's family sued Iran, holding the country accountable
for funding the group responsible for the terrorist attack.58
The Shaqaqi faction of the Palestine Islamic Jihad, whose sole
source of funding was Iran, claimed responsibility for the bombing.59
Accordingly, the district court found that Iran's support for this terrorist
organization exposed it to suit under the terrorism exception. 60 The
plaintiffs were ultimately awarded a little over $247.5 million, including
$225 million in punitive damages.'

55. See Kerr v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 01-1994, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2238, at *2
(D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2003) (awarding default judgment based solely on the evidence presented by the
plaintiff after Iran failed to appear before the court); Surette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 231 F.
Supp. 2d 260, 262 (D.D.C. 2002) (same); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13,
16 (D.D.C. 2002) (same); Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 81 (D.D.C.
2002) (same); Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 224, (D.D.C. 2002) (same);
Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2001) (same); Sutherland v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30 (D.D.C. 2001) (same); Wagner v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128, 131 (D.D.C. 2001) (same); Polhill v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 001798 (TPJ), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15322, at *1 n.] (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2001) (same); Mousa v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2001) (same); Elahi v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 99-100 (D.D.C. 2000) (same); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F.
Supp. 2d 107, 109 n.l (D.D.C. 2000) (same); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d
I (D.D.C. 2000) (same); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 34 (D.D.C. 2000)
(same); Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 1:99CV0037, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22173, at * 1
(D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2000) (same); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.D.C.
1998) (same).
56. 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998).
57. See id. at 7.
58. See id. at 6-8.
59. See id. at 8.
60. See id. at 9-11.
61. See id. at 5. With regard to punitive damages, the court stated: "Prior to the state
sponsored terrorism amendments, the FSIA absolutely prohibited the award or recovery of punitive
damages against the foreign state itself. The Flatow Amendment, however, departs from the prior
enactment by expressly providing a cause of action for punitive damages for state sponsored
terrorism." Id. at 25 (citations omitted). The court continued:
Even if 28 U.S.C. § 1606 applies to causes of action brought directly against a foreign
state pursuant to the state sponsored terrorism exception to immunity and the Flatow
Amendment, a foreign state sponsor of terrorism can still be indirectly liable for punitive
damages under the principles of respondeat superior and vicarious liability.
Id. at 25-26.
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2. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran62 is the first of a series of
kidnapping cases brought under the terrorism exception by U.S. citizens
and their families that were abducted and held captive in the 1980s by
the terrorist organization Hizbollah, 63 acting as an agent of the Iranian
government. 64 In Cicippio, three former U.S. civilian hostages, along
with two of their wives, sued Iran under the 1996 amendment to the
FSIA, § 1605(a)(7).65 Over the course of a few months, beginning in
1985, the three men were kidnapped one by one and held captive by
Hizbollah. 66 At the time of the abductions the three men were all living
in Beirut, Lebanon.67
The plaintiffs were able to prove to the court all the necessary
elements to successfully sue Iran under § 1605(a)(7). 6' Therefore, the
court held for the plaintiffs. 69 A judgment was entered against Iran in the
amount of $65 million.7 °
3. Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran
In Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran,7' Terry Anderson, an
American journalist, and his family brought an action against Iran
pursuant to § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA. n In 1985, Anderson had been
kidnapped in Beirut, Lebanon, and held captive and tortured for close to
seven years before he was finally released. 73 The court stated: "In the
instant case the evidence once again discloses that Iran provided
Hezbollah with funding, direction and training for its terrorist activities
in Lebanon, including the kidnapping and torture of Terry Anderson, and
his imprisonment as a hostage for 2,454 days. 74 The court went on to
say: "Iran falls within FSIA's definition of a state sponsor of terrorism
and is thus liable for the injuries suffered by plaintiffs as a result of

62. 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998).
63. "Hizbollah" is spelled several different ways. It most often appears written "Hizbollah" or
"Hezbollah." Hereinafter, it will be referred to as "Hizbollah."
64. See Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109 n.1(D.D.C. 2000).
65. See Cicippio, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 63-64.
66. See id. at 64.
67. See id.
68. See id.
at 68.
69. See id. at 70.
70. See id.
71. 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C.2000).
72. See id. at 108-09.
73. See id. at 108.
74. Id. at 113.
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Hezbollah's terrorist acts., 75 A judgment was entered on behalf of the
plaintiffs for an amount close to $350 million, including $300 million in
punitive damages.76
4. Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran
The families of the American victims of a 1996 bus bombing in
Israel brought suit pursuant to § 1605(a)(7) against Iran and several
other defendants in Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran.7 A terrorist
group by the name of Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing and
the plaintiffs were able to show a strong financial link between Hamas
and Iran. 78 The court held the defendants liable for over $327 million,
including $300 million of punitive damages.79
5. Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran
In Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,8° Darius Elahi brought an
action for the assassination of his brother in 1990 against Iran and the
Iranian Ministry of Information Security ("MOIS") for ordering the
murder.8 ' The court found the necessary elements to satisfy the
conditions of § 1605(a)(7).82 The court concluded, "for the reasons more
fully set forth above, the defendants are judged liable for the
assassination o[f] Dr. Elahi under the provisions of the FSIA."83 The
court awarded the plaintiff over $310 million in damages, including
$300 million in punitive damages.
6. Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran
In 1985, Thomas Sutherland, a professor at American University of
Beirut, was kidnapped by Hizbollah in Lebanon and held captive and
tortured for over six years.85 In Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran,6
Sutherland and his family sued Iran and MOIS for the financial support87
and oversight of Hizbollah, which was responsible for the kidnapping.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
See id. at 114.
172 F. Supp. 2d 1,3-4 (D.D.C. 2000).
See id. at 5.
See id.
at10-11.
124 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2000).
See id. at 99.
See id. at 106-08.
Id. at 114.
See id.
at114-15.
See Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2001).
Id.
See id. at 31.
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The evidence presented in this case left the court to conclude that the
facts at hand fall directly into the required provisions of the terrorism
exception to the FSIA. s8 The defendants were held liable for
compensatory damages in the amount of approximately $53 million.89 In
addition, the plaintiffs were awarded $300 million in damages against
MOIS.9°

7. Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran
In 1985, Father Jenco was kidnapped while working in a Catholic
church in Beirut, Lebanon. 9' He was held captive for 564 days. 92 As did
Terry Anderson and Thomas Sutherland, Jenco's co-hostages, 93 Father
Jenco and his family filed suit against Iran.94
As in the precedent cases of his co-hostages, the court found "that
Father Jenco's captors were members of the Islamic group Hizbollah and
that Hizbollah was funded and controlled by the Iranian government and
the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security." 95 This determination,
along with the other pertinent facts of the case, clearly removed Iran's
right of foreign sovereign immunity and placed the case well within the
necessary framework set forth under § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA.96 Iran was
held liable for over $314 million, $300 million of which constitutes
punitive damages. 97
8. Polhill v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Robert Polhill, a U.S. citizen, was teaching at Beirut University
College when he was kidnapped in 1987 and held captive in Lebanon for
thirty-nine months.98 Years later, Polhill's family brought an action
against Iran in accordance with § 1605(a)(7), claiming that the country
provided material support to the terrorist organization responsible for the
kidnapping.99 The plaintiffs were able to show that there was a link
88. See id. at 45-47 (explaining step-by-step how the facts of the case meet each of the
requirements of § 1605(a)(7)).
89. See id. at 53.
90. See id.
91. See Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2001).
92. See id.
93. See id. at 29 n.2.
94. See id. at 27.
95. Id. at 30.
96. See id. at 33.
97. See id. at 40.
98. See Polhill v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 00-1798 (TPJ), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15322,
at *2-6, 17-18 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2001).
99. See id. at *12-13.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 6

832

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 31:819

between Hizbollah, the group responsible for the kidnapping, and Iran.' °°
In addition, the facts of the case satisfied all the conditions of
§ 1605(a)(7), Iran was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and
Robert Polhill, the victim, was a U.S. national at the time of the
amount
incident.'0 ' The court entered a judgment for the plaintiffs in 0the
2
damages.
punitive
in
million
$300
including
of $332 million,
9. Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran
In 1984, U.S. Navy Petty Officer First Class Michael Wagner was
killed in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. 13
Hizbollah was responsible for the bombing. 4 Shortly after the incident
an undeniable connection was made between Hizbollah and Iran.' 3°
However, the family of Michael Wagner had no legal recourse against
the country until the passage of the 1996 amendments to the FSIA,
which allowed the plaintiffs the opportunity to sue Iran for sponsoring
terrorism.'6
In the decision, the court stated: "It is equally apparent from the
evidence before this Court that Hizballah ...substantially funded and
supported by Iran and MOIS since 1979, perpetrated the September 20,
1984 terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut."'0 7 The court held
that the "the suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy ...qualifie[d] as an
extrajudicial killing for purposes of the FSIA."'0s All the other
requirements of § 1605(a)(7) were met as well 09 and, therefore, the court
awarded damages to the plaintiffs."0 The plaintiffs were awarded over
$316 million, including $300 million in punitive damages."'
100. See id. at *11.
101. Seeid. at*13.
102. See id. at *17-18.
103. See Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128, 130 (D.D.C. 2001).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 132.
106. See id. at 13 1.It was nearly two decades after the bombing at the embassy before the
plaintiffs filed suit against Iran under the terrorist exception. See id.
107. Id. at 134.
108. id. at 133.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 138.
Ill. See id. The events of September 11th clearly weighed on the mind of the court when the
judgment was entered against Iran because the case was before the court shortly after the September
I1 th terrorist attacks. See id. The court commented:
Now more than ever, this Court believes that the acts of terrorists and their sponsors
must be punished to the full extent to which civil damage awards might operate to
suppress such activities in the future. Indeed, Dr. Clausen opined that since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, Iran has become increasingly aware of the pending FSIA
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C. Iraq as a Defendant
Two judgments have been entered thus far against Iraq. The first
judgment was entered before September 11 th in Daliberti v. Republic of
Iraq.1 2 The suit was brought by four United States citizens and their
wives, after the men were taken hostage and tortured." 3 In response to
the lawsuit, Iraq's motion to dismiss was denied by the district court."4
"Following the denial, defendant's counsel withdrew from the case, and
the Clerk of Court entered a default against the defendant on October 16,
'
2000.""The plaintiffs moved for a default judgment a few weeks
'
6
later." Following an ex parte bench trial, the court decided that
"judgment shall be entered for the plaintiffs.""' 7
The court entered a damage award of close to $19 million against
Iraq. ' Out of that total amount, approximately $13 million was
allocated to the four male plaintiffs," 9 while $6 million was to be equally
distributed to the four wives."O
Shortly following September 11 th, a second judgment was entered
against Iraq in Hill v. Republic of Iraq.2' The case was brought by
lawsuits against it here in the United States, and a failure to impose a substantial punitive
award against MOIS might be misinterpreted as an inclination on the part of the courts of
the United States to be more tolerant of Iranian-sponsored terrorism of a somewhat
distant past. That may be a policy option of diplomacy, but not of the law. Terrorism,
past and future, is the implacable enemy of all civilization under law.
Id.
112. 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
113. See id. at 41. The four male plaintiffs all lived in Kuwait and worked around the KuwaitIraq border as civilians. See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2001).
"Beginning in 1992, in separate incidents, each male plaintiff was taken into custody by Iraq
government employees, and held captive in Iraq." Id.
114. See Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 55. The district court noted:
In only one of these cases other than this one, Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, did the defendant respond to the complaint. The decisions in Anderson,
Cicippio, Flatow and Alejandre all resulted in default judgments. As in suits against the
United States, however, the FSIA requires that the court make findings of fact sufficient
to support the entry of a default judgment. In Anderson, Cicippio, Flatow, and Alejandre,
therefore, the courts heard evidence-albeit only from the plaintiffs-and entered
findings of fact.
Id. at 44 n.2 (citations omitted).
115. Daliberti, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
116. Seeid. at21.
117. Id. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims fell within the terrorism exception and
therefore entitled the plaintiffs to damages. See id. at 24-25.
118. Seeid.at27.
119. See id. The court looked at prior cases based on the FSIA for guidance in determining the
appropriate amount of damages that should be awarded to the plaintiffs. See id. at 25-26.
120. See id. at 27.
121. 175 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2001).
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twelve United States citizens "who were detained against their will in
Kuwait and Iraq between August and December, 1990. "22' The victims
held Iraq and Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, responsible for
hostage taking, false imprisonment, personal injury, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, assault, battery, and loss of consortium under the
FSIA.'23 The court found the defendants liable for these offenses and
awarded the plaintiffs a total of $9.11 million in compensatory
damages. 2 4 In addition, the plaintiffs received $300 million each against
Saddam Hussein for punitive damages.'25
V.

COLLECTING JUDGMENTS

The passage of the AEDPA in 1996 enabled the plaintiffs discussed
in Part IV to go after state sponsors of terrorism in court and obtain a
judgment. However, following the 1996 legislation, plaintiffs still
encountered difficulties collecting their judgments.'2 6 In an effort to
correct this problem Congress amended the FSIA again in 1998 to
"permit[] the targeting of frozen assets held in the United States by
foreign state sponsors of terrorism."' 27 However, Congress could not
ignore the fact that "frozen foreign assets are traditionally seen as tools
of foreign policy uniquely within the control of the President, [and
therefore] further provided that the President could waive this provision
to go after the frozen assets as he saw fit."'2 President Clinton exercised
a blanket waiver of this provision on the date of enactment of the act in
Presidential Determination 99-1 that "effectively prevented anyone from

122. Id. at 38.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 47-48.
125. See id. at 49.
126. See Michael L. Martinez, Esq. & Stuart H. Newberger, Esq., Combating State-Sponsored
Terrorism with Civil Lawsuits: Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran and Other Cases, 3 VICTIM
ADVOCATE 5, 7 (2002). The key reason plaintiffs have been unsuccessful is because countries that
have been designated as state sponsors of terrorism obviously have hostile relations with the United
States and are therefore not going to voluntarily pay these judgments. See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross,
Note, Resolving Outstanding Judgments Under the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 496, 512 (2002). In addition, "[tihe United States already has
imposed sanctions upon states designated as terrorism sponsors, and thus defendant states generally
view the prospect of civil liability for state-sponsored terrorism as an extension of an already-hostile
U.S. foreign policy." Id. at 512. Therefore defendant states refuse to make a court appearance or
satisfy a judgment. See Vadnais, supra note 29, at 216-17.
127. Martinez & Newberger, supra note 126, at 7.
128. Id.
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pursuing frozen assets," despite the fact that he signed the legislation
into law.'2 9
In 2000, Congress amended the FSIA to address the inability of
plaintiffs to enforce their judgments in a specific set of cases.'3 ° The
amendment is known as the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act
("JVTA")3 ' and provides an alternative means of compensation only for
a select group of cases against Iran and Cuba. 3 2 The JVTA only applies
to the collection of compensatory damages, not punitive damages.'33
The manner in which a judgment is paid under the JVTA depends
on whether the defendant was Iran or Cuba. Approximately $400 million
is available to cover the judgments entered against Iran, "the amount of
Iranian assets the Pentagon has held frozen for more than twenty
years.,'1 4 "After payments are made from these assets, the United States
will assume the position of judgment creditor against Iran."' 35 This
means that the United States government picked up a $400 million tab in

129. Id.; see also Presidential Determination No. 99-1,63 Fed. Reg. 59, 201 (Oct. 21, 1998).
130. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 126, at 513.
131. The Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act is codified as part of the Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 2002, 2003, 114 Stat. 1464, 1541-43
(2000).
132. See id. § 2002(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 114 Stat. at 1542 (stating the amendment applies to the
cases that had reached final judgment against Iran or Cuba as of July 20, 2000 and those cases filed
under the terrorism exception on February 17, 1999, December 13, 1999, January 28, 2000, March
15, 2000, or July 27, 2000); see also Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 126, at 513; Heiser, supra note
14, at *40. Prior to the JVTA's passage, there had been several unsuccessful attempts by plaintiffs
to execute judgments entered in their favor under the terrorism exception. See Foster, supra note 7,
at 522 n.40 and accompanying text.
133. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 126, at 513-14 ("These claimants may elect to collect
compensatory damages and interest from the U.S. government in exchange for their right to any
further payment of their outstanding judgments, including payment of the punitive damage
awards."). For example,
Since 2000, successful FSIA plaintiffs can be paid their compensatory damages
from the U.S. Treasury. However, this remedy has tremendous problems. First, the
claimants must give up all claim[s] to punitive damages, which are, by far, the largest
portions of the claims. For example, the estate of Friar Jenco and his six siblings could
demand $14,640,000 from the U.S. Treasury but would thereby forego $300 million in
punitive damages. Second, any sort of moral victory by victims or their decedents is
eliminated, since the torturers, kidnappers, and murderers pay nothing and the punitives
are eliminated.
Keith Sealing, "State Sponsors of Terrorism" Is a Question, Not an Answer: The Terrorism
Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now Than It Did Before 9/11, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 119,
143 (2003).
134. Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 126, at 514; see Heiser, supra note 14, *40 (stating Congress
enacted the JVTA and Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 "to provide new
options for payment of some money judgment directly from the United States Treasury
Department").
135. Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 126, at 514; see Heiser, supra note 14, at *40.
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the hope that Iran will repay the money in the future when relations with
the U.S. are restored or the money can be used as a bargaining chip
when times are difficult. 136
With respect to Cuba, under the JVTA, judgments against the
country will be made from frozen assets of the Cuban government
located in the United States. 37 "The U.S. government recently approved
the transfer of nearly $97 million of these assets to the Alejandre
plaintiffs.' 38 However, some people are skeptical of this and believe the
U.S. taxpayers will end up paying for the Cuban judgments as well. For
instance, Allan Mendelsohn, a law professor at Georgetown University,
predicts Cuba will be reimbursed when relations with the country are
restored.'3 9 Mendelsohn commented: "The Cubans will say you owe us,
and you don't think the United States will not find a way to pay them,
especially when we will be trying to help rebuild' 40Cuba? I am convinced
that this is going to cost taxpayers in the future.'
VI.

CIVIL SUIT AGAINST IRAQ: ASHTON V. AL QAEDA ISLAMIC ARMY

A.

The Complaint

On Wednesday, September 4, 2002, a lawsuit seeking more than $1
trillion in damages was filed in the U.S. District Court in Manhattan on
behalf of 1,400 victims of the September 11 th terrorist attacks and their
families. 4 ' The three key defendants named in the lawsuit are Osama bin
Laden, al Qaeda, and Iraq.' 42 The civil lawsuit was brought by a New
York City law firm, Kreindler & Kreindler, which specializes in aviation
disaster litigation.' 43 Recently, the lawsuit was consolidated with other
terrorism lawsuits that had been filed in New York by several other law
136. See Yigal
Schleifer, Suing
Bin Laden,
MOTHERJONES.COM
(Jan.
30,
2002), at http://Www.motherjones.conz/web-exclusives/features/news/suing-osania.html.
137. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 126, at 515; Heiser, supra note 14, at *40.
138. Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 126, at 515.
139. See Schleifer, supra note 136.
140. Id.
141. See Lawsuit: Iraq Involved in 9/11
Conspiracy (Sept. 5, 2002), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/20O2/O9/O5/septemberl l/main520874.shtml.
142. See id.
143. See Kreindler & Kreindler, About the Firm, at http://www.kreindler.con/about.htm (last
visited Mar. 22, 2003). Kreindler & Kreindler "also successfully negotiated a $2.7-billion settlement
this year with Libyan businessmen on behalf of 270 victims of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight
103, which the United States claimed was orchestrated by Libyan government agents, though the
Libyan government denied it." Paul Vitello, Holding Court on Terror Plot, NEWSDAY (Nassau),
Sept. 5, 2002, at A2.
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firms and on January 7, 2003, a Consolidated Master Complaint
("CMC" or "the lawsuit") was filed by Kreindler & Kreindler.'" The
CMC has added defendants such as Sudan and Iran to the lawsuit, which45
of terrorism.'
are both on the State Department's list of state sponsors
The lawsuit attempts to "draw the kind of strong link between Iraq and
terrorism 46that the US government has never alleged in public court
actions."'
The lawsuit, in count six, makes a claim under the AEDPA against
Iraq and Iraqi Intelligence. Count six states as follows:
ANTI TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
CLAIM, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A)(7) - - IRAQ, IRAN AND THE SUDAN
614. Plaintiffs reallege the paragraphs above as if fully set forth
herein.
615. The death of the plaintiff's decedents and injury to personal
injury plaintiffs, who were citizens of the United States at the
time, resulted from acts of extrajudicial killing, torture and aircraft
sabotage.
616. These acts of extra judicial killing, torture and aircraft
sabotage were perpetrated by agents of BIN LADEN and AL
QAEDA, who received material support and resources from
defendants, TALIBAN, IRAQ, IRAQI INTELLIGENCE,
SUDAN, SUDANESE INTELLIGENCE, IRAN, IRANIAN
INTELLIGENCE, SUDAN and IRAN.
617. Agents, officials or employees of defendants, TALIBAN,
IRAQ, IRAN and the SUDAN provided material support and
resources to BIN LADEN and AL QAEDA while acting in the
scope of their offices, agencies, or employment. Similar conduct,

at
available
Developments,
Recent
&
Kreindler,
Kreindler
144. See
http://www.kreindler.comniews/wtcandpentagon4.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003) [hereinafter
Recent Developments].
145. See Consolidated Master Complaint at 57-58, No. 02CV6977 (S.D.N.Y
filed Jan. 7, 2003), available at http://www.kreindler.con/news/wtcandpentagon4.htm [hereinafter
CMC]; 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2002). The lawsuit identifies over one hundred defendants. See Recent
Developments, supra note 144. Besides Iraq, the plaintiffs are suing, among others, the al Qaeda
Islamic Army, Osama bin Laden personally, as well as Saddam Hussein, the twenty terrorist
hijackers, including Zacarias Moussaoui, the Taliban, several international banks in the Arab world,
a number of charitable Muslim foundations, and two Saudi princes. See id.
at
5,
2002),
(Sept.
Attacks'
of
al-Qaeda
Knew
146. 'Iraq
http://vww.news24.com/News24/USAttack/O,l 13,2-1195_1252843,00.html.
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if committed by agents, officials or employees of the United
States, would be actionable.
618. At all relevant times, defendants IRAQ, SUDAN and IRAN
were and are designated by the U.S. Government as a state
sponsor of terrorism.
619. The activities of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the
TALIBAN regime, as described in this Complaint, were
effectively deemed terrorist activities pursuant to former President
Clinton's July 4, 1999, Executive Order No. 13129 and the
continuation Order of June 30, 2001, issued by President George
W. Bush. In addition, after the terrorist acts on September 11,
2001, President George W. Bush and other senior U.S.,[sic]
officials clearly designated the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as
having sponsored and supported the terrorists. For example, see
President George W. Bush's September 24, 2001, Executive Order
on Terrorist Financing (Executive Order No. 13224).
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand judgment be entered in favor of
plaintiffs individually and as personal representatives of their
decedents' estates and in favor of the personal injury plaintiffs
personally and against defendants IRAQ and IRAQI
INTELLIGENCE, IRAN and SUDAN and their instrumentalities
and agents for an amount in excess of FIFTY MILLION
($50,000,000.00) DOLLARS for each plaintiff, plus interest,
costs, punitive damages, attorneys fees, and such other relief as the
Court deems just and proper.147
The lawsuit claims that Iraqi officials knew of bin Laden's plan to
attack the United States on September 11, 2001.48 In addition, the suit
alleges that Iraq sponsored terrorists for years to avenge its defeat in the
Gulf War.149 The lawsuit states: "Since Iraq could not defeat the U.S.
military, it resorted to terror attacks on U.S. citizens."' 50 The lawsuit "is
based on a mixture of already-reported contacts between agents for the
two avowed enemies of the United States, on the presumption of their
shared interests, and on an intriguing newspaper column in the

147.
148.
149.
150.

CMC, supra note 145, at 261-263.
See id. at 115.
See id.
at 95.
Id. at 74.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss3/6

20

Balducci: American Taxpayers Bear the Burden of Beating Iraq in the Courtro
BEATING IRAQ IN THE COURTROOM

20031

government-controlled Iraqi press published six weeks before Sept.
11."151

B.

The Case Against Iraq

The plaintiffs in Ashton v. al Qaeda Islamic Army undoubtedly
have a strong case against Iraq. This Note is written on the assumption
that the plaintiffs will not only win (as far as their claim goes against
Iraq) but will also be awarded a massive judgment against the defendant.
Nonetheless, this section will flesh out the plaintiffs' argument against
Iraq under the AEDPA.
Iraq will most likely fail to appear before the court and will
therefore default. However, before the court can enter a judgment by
default against Iraq, pursuant to the FSIA, the plaintiff must "establish[]
his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court."'' 2 The
plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of § 1605(a)(7).
The FSIA provides exceptions where a foreign state shall not be
immune from suit in U.S. courts. 53 Under § 1605(a)(7) a foreign state
loses immunity where
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury
or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support
or resources ... for such an act if such act or provision of material
support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign
state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or
154
agency.
To break this down, the plaintiffs must first demonstrate that one of
the listed acts under § 1605(a)(7) was committed in order for the state
sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA to apply. Second, the
plaintiffs must establish that the act was perpetrated by a group receiving
material support or resources from Iraq. Third, the plaintiffs must prove
that the provision of material support or resources was engaged in by an
agent, official, or employee of Iraq while acting in the scope of his
agency, office, or employment.

151. Vitello, supra note 143.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2000). As in prior terrorism exception cases, most likely the
plaintiffs' uncontroverted evidence will be accepted as true by the court, and thereby lessen the
burden on the plaintiffs. See Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D.D.C.

2000).
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000); supra Part Ill.
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
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In addition, three more elements must be satisfied in order to bring
suit under § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA. First, the foreign state must be
designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism as55
accorded under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.1
Second, the act must have occurred outside of the foreign state.'5 6 Lastly,
the claimant or victim57 must have been a United States national at the
time the act occurred.1
The facts of this case clearly meet the three requirements of
§ 1605(a)(7)(A)-(B). First, Iraq is designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979." 8 Second, undeniable evidence shows that the act occurred in the
United States, therefore satisfying the requirement that the act occur
outside the foreign state." 9 Third, the surviving victims participating in
this lawsuit were all United States nationals at the time of the terrorist
attack and either the plaintiff who is representing a deceased victim or
the victim the plaintiff is representing were United States nationals at the
time of the terrorist attack.' 6°
The victims named in this suit were subject to acts of torture,
extrajudicial killing, and aircraft sabotage on September 11 th as pursuant
to the definitions adopted by § 1605(e)(1) and (3),'6' and resulted in
either the personal injury or death of the said victims. The plaintiffs have
ample evidence to demonstrate to the court that these three categories of
acts occurred and therefore, there is no need to go into great detail. First,
what happened to all the victims, both surviving and deceased, clearly
falls well within the definition of torture.' 62 Second, the murder of the

155. See id. § 1605(a)(7)(A).
156. See id. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(i).
157. See id. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii).
158. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2002).
159. See Moses, supra note I (describing where the terrorist attacks took place); see also CMC,
supra note 145 at 68-69.
160. See CMC, supra note 145 at 65 (stating that the plaintiffs "are U.S. citizens, residents or
foreign citizens"). According to the Immigration and Nationality Act, a "United States national" is
defined as "(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the
United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(22) (2000). This
requirement can easily be satisfied by providing a birth certificate, passport or other official
documents as evidence towards ones standing as a U.S. national.
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(e)(1), (3) (2000).
162. The following definition of torture was adopted by § 1605(e)(1):
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by
which severe pain or suffering ... whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person
information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third
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victims listed in this suit constituted extrajudicial killings as set forth in
the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. '63Third, the use of the four
aircrafts as weapons clearly meets the definition of aircraft sabotage. '
The plaintiffs must produce evidence showing that the acts
discussed above were perpetrated by a group receiving material support
or resources from Iraq. There is no doubt that Osama bin Laden and al
Qaeda were responsible for the events that occurred on September 11 th,
especially in light of the fact that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda have
publicly taken credit for the terrorist attacks.' 6' However, showing that
bin Laden and al Qaeda received material support or resources from Iraq
may prove more difficult.
The FSIA allows for claims against a foreign state that provides
material support or resources for acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, and
aircraft sabotage.' 66 Therefore, the plaintiffs must show that Iraq
provided material support or resources to bin Laden and al Qaeda that
caused the extrajudicial killing, torture, and aircraft sabotage of the
victims listed in this suit. 67 The complaint alleges Iraq provided al
Qaeda with "support, funding, facilities and training.,,16' The suit
explains the benefits to both Iraq and al Qaeda for teaming up together
against the United States.'69 The plaintiffs plan on demonstrating this
link through the use of "'a combination of media reports, personal
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that
individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discriminatioi of any kind.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000).
163. Extrajudicial killing is defined as:
a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such
killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a
foreign nation.
Id.
164. The definition of aircraft sabotage was adopted from Article I of the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. The term is defined as:
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:
(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or
exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act
commits an offence (hereinafter referred to as "the offence").
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 1, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 1644.
165. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bin Laden, On Tape, Boasts of Trade CenterAttacks; U.S. Says it
Proves His Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,2001, at AI.
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
167. See id.
168. CMC, supra note 145, at 75.
169. See id.
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interviews with witnesses who have been in Iraq and Kurdistan and
observed many things firsthand, interviews with former U.S. intelligence
officers and court documents and affidavits."" '7 In addition, there is a
strong possibility that new evidence supporting the connection between
Iraq and the terrorists responsible for September 11 th will surface in the
months to come following the end of Saddam's reign of terror.
Although, some may argue Iraq's ties to September 11th are dubious,
there is no doubt that the plaintiffs will be able to provide undisputed
evidence that Iraq supported bin Laden and al Qaeda.
Lastly, the plaintiffs need to establish evidence that the provision of
material support or resources was engaged in by an agent, official, or
employee of Iraq while acting in the scope of his agency, office, or
employment. In paragraphs fifteen and sixteen of the complaint the
plaintiffs name the alleged officials, employees, and agents of Iraq that
acted within the scope of their employment while providing material
support or resources to bin Laden and al Qaeda."' Once the previously
discussed step is established this step will be easy to prove.
C. Why Sue Iraq?
The main objective of naming Iraq as a defendant is to make the
country pay. Pay morally. Pay financially. Morally, in the eyes of the
victims, Iraq will pay by being held accountable in an official setting,
namely a judicial proceeding, for its actions. '
Financially, the hope of the victims is that Iraq will have to pay the
enormous judgment entered against it, not for the victims to

170. New Lawsuits Claim Iraq Knew About 9/11 Terrorist Attacks, CLASS ACTION LITIG.
(Sept. 2002), at 7, available at http://www.andrewpub.com/rptr-desc.asp?pub=MAS (last visited

Mar. 22, 2003). The statement was given by an investigator for the firm representing the plaintiffs,
Christine Negroni. See id.; see also Lawsuit: Iraq Involved in 9/11 Conspiracy, supra note 141
(discussing the newspaper article in al Nasiriyah that the plaintiffs will use as evidence that Iraq

knew of the September Ilthattacks beforehand). In addition, on numerous occasions, including a
televised interview with Dan Rather in February, 2003, Saddam Hussein had the opportunity to
deny his involvement in the September I Ith attacks, and connection with Osama bin Laden and al
Qaeda, and therefore, the court is more likely to conclude that a nexus exists between them. See 60
Minutes
11, Transcript:
Saddam
Hussein
Ilterview,
Pt.
1,
available
at
http://vww.cbsnews.conn/strories/2003/O2/26/6011/main542151.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
Furthermore, on May 7, 2003, a federal judge held that "Iraq provided material support to Osama
bin Laden and his terrorist group al-Qaida for the Sept. 11,2001, attack and is liable to pay $104
million in damages to two victims' families." Patricia Hurtado, Judge Orders Iraq to Pay 2 9/11
Families, NEWSDAY (Nassau), May, 8, 2003, at A43. This holding will surely serve as precedent to
the case at hand.
171. SeeCMC, supranote 145, at 71.
172. See McKay, supra note 11,at 468 n. 166 and accompanying text.
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economically gain from the lawsuit but rather to act as a deterrent. 73 For
instance: "Take the assets away, exact a price for terrorism, hold
terrorists accountable.' 74 Perhaps better put, "[i]f you hit people in the
pocketbook, it will have a deterrent effect .... If you pay a lot of
money, you won't sponsor terrorism in the future."' 75 Many plaintiffs in
this case probably feel that by going after Iraq and holding the country
financially responsible, they are helping fight terrorism by cutting off the
money supply.
VII.

WHO Is GOING TO PAY: IRAQ OR THE AMERICAN TAXPAYERS?

A. Title II Section 201 of the TerrorismRisk InsuranceAct of 2002
In the aftermath of September 11 th, Congress rushed to create antiterrorism legislation. The new legislation ranged from improving
aviation security'76 to providing tax relief to victims. '7 As in the past,
one of the many concerns of the lawmakers was the ability of victims
who were awarded judgments against state sponsors of terrorism to
reach blocked assets in order to satisfy those judgments.
In anticipation of lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism, and
in the wake of September 1 th, several bills were introduced to the
Senate and House with respect to this issue. Although the language of
the bills introduced varied slightly, the intent was the same. Finally on
November 26, 2002, the President signed TRIA into law. 7 9 Title II,

173. The same is true here as realized in past lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism, "the
plaintiffs [are] not after financial gains as much as after a moral victory: to force accountability
from otherwise unreachable officials and parties involved behind the scenes with the terrorist
attack." Reinout van Wagtendonk, Radio Netherlands, Suing al-Qaeda Bankrollers, at
http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/usO20816.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
174. Craig Gilbert, A Lifetime of Heartache, JOURNAL SENTINEL, available at
http://www.jsonline.com/news/nat/sep02/72114.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
175. Seth Stern, Cat a Trillion-dollar Lawsuit Stop Saudi Terror-Cash Flow?, CHRISTIAN
(last
SCIENCE MONITOR, available at http://www.csnonitor.com/2002/O820/pO2sO2-usju.html
visited Mar. 22, 2003). The statement is by Allan Gerson, co-counsel in the Pan Am flight 103 suit
and a lecturer at George Washington University's law school. See id.
176. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
177. See Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427
(2002). These are just two examples of a long list of legislation that was passed post-September
I lth. See Legislation related to the Attack of September 11, 2001, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm#three (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
178. See Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, S. 1772, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002); Terrorism
Victim's Access to Compensation Act of 2002, S. 2134, 107th Cong. § 4 (2002); Justice for Victims
of Terrorism Act of 2002, H.R. 4647, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002).
179. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
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Section 201 of TRIA is called "Satisfaction of Judgments from Blocked
Assets of Terrorists, Terrorist Organizations, and State Sponsors of
Terrorism.'

80

The statute states in pertinent part:

(a)... Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as
provided in subsection (b), in every case in which a person has
obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an
act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under
section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, the blocked assets of
that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or
instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or
attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the
extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has
been adjudged liable.
(b) PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER(1)... Subject to paragraph (2), upon determining on an asset-byasset basis that a waiver is necessary in the national security
interest, the President may waive the requirements of subsection
(a) in connection with (and prior to the enforcement of) any
judicial order directing attachment in aid of execution or execution
against any property subject to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. '8'
In addition, included in the law is a special rule created to address cases
against Iran.'82
Section (a) reaffirms victims' access to frozen terrorist assets,
including those of state sponsors of terrorism. 183 However, victims of

terrorism who prevail in court under § 1605(a)(7) may only collect the
amount they were awarded in compensatory damages.' 84 Section
(b) permits a Presidential waiver under specific circumstances. "" The
section clearly states that a Presidential waiver may be exercised with
regard to section (a) for diplomatic property and on an asset-by-asset
basis only if it is necessary for national security interests. 1 6 The purpose
of § 201(b) was to set straight the intended use for a Presidential waiver

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

id. § 201(c).
id. § 201(a).
id.
id. § 201(b).
id.
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by clarifying the scope of such waiver. However, the Presidential waiver
in part (b) of the law will likely result in the American taxpayers footing
the cost for any courtroom victories against a state sponsor of terrorism.
B. The Affect of the New Legislation on the American Taxpayers
With the enactment of § 201 of TRIA, Congress intended to pass
legislation that will make it easier for victims to collect their judgments
against states, like Iraq, that sponsor terrorism, but instead they created
legislation that will put the burden of beating Iraq in the courtroom on
the innocent American taxpayers. The fact is, that despite legislation to
help victims of terrorism collect judgments from blocked assets of the
seven countries the U.S. designated as state sponsors of terrorism, it is
highly unlikely that the plaintiffs in 7 the case discussed will see any
money from the frozen assets of Iraq.
The President is certain to exercise his right to the use of the
Presidential waiver in § 201(b) of TRIA. Undoubtedly, the recent war
with Iraq will play a major role in this decision. 8 8 The use of the
Presidential waiver will thereby deny the plaintiffs access to Iraqi frozen
assets which will be necessary to satisfy the judgments entered against
the country.
In the past, the U.S. State Department along with the U.S. Treasury
have blocked victims' access to frozen foreign assets. The government
defended this policy by arguing that keeping the money frozen is
essential to foreign policy. 8 9 The government is likely to do the same
with regard to Iraqi frozen assets. The decision is likely to be based on
not only the usual broad national security argument, but also on a more
narrow argument tailored to the current changing relationship between
the United States and Iraq.
The State Department has historically opposed releasing frozen
foreign assets, often arguing national security. In the interest of national
security, the government has argued, the assets need to remain frozen to

187. As a side note, for example, in one of the cases filed after September 1 th, the Taliban
regime and al Qaeda organizations were named as defendants, not countries. Following September
1 th, the United States seized approximately $250 million worth of assets tied to the Taliban and al
Qaeda, however the U.S. recently returned most of the money to Afghanistan. Approximately $34
million still remains frozen, but that is an insignificant amount "compared to the possible damage
claims." Schleifer, supra note 136.
188. Since the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the U.S. government
threatened to go to war with Iraq. On March 19, 2003, the threat became a reality. See President
Bush Addresses the Nation, supra note 4.
189. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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act as a bargaining tool to coerce change in terrorist nations' 90 and to
avoid other countries from creating similar laws.' 9' Now more then ever,
holding on to these assets makes sense.
The war against terrorism promises to be long and difficult, and the
United States will need every diplomatic tool at its disposal. The
prospect of normalizing relations with countries that currently are
designated as state sponsors of terrorism can be used to build and
maintain the anti-terror coalition. It also can be used to make these
countries more accountable for their actions, thus helping to ensure that
they do not revert back to the sponsorship of terrorism.' 92 The
government is sure to insist that in this new era of global terrorism, the
United States cannot afford to give up any leverage it has; many may
find this hard to disagree with. 93

In a more narrow argument, strictly with regard to Iraq, the State
Department is likely to argue that the assets should not be released
because of the promising regime change and the need to mend the
relationship between the United States and Iraq when this change occurs.
Once the war with Iraq is over and the United States is helping rebuild
Iraq, the government is going to want to return the frozen foreign assets
to Iraq as a gesture of good faith and also to help rebuild a country that is
already economically struggling.
After the President exerts his authority to invoke the Presidential
waiver, legislation will be passed providing for at least part, if not all, of
94
the judgment entered against Iraq to be paid out of the U.S. Treasury.'
For example, the legislation will probably be similar to that passed to
satisfy the judgments in the terrorism exception cases entered against

190.
191.
creating
already

See Gilbert, supra note 174.
See McKay, supra note 11, at 458-61 (arguing the United States fears other countries
similar legislation and thereby subjecting the U.S. to suit in foreign countries). Iran has
passed similar legislation that allows Iranians to sue the United States. See Michael

Theodoulou, Tehran Court Rules Against US, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,

available at

http://www.csmonitor.com/2OO3/O203/pO6sOJ-wome.html(last visited Mar. 22, 2003). To date one
case naming the U.S. as a defendant has successfully been brought in Iran. See id. The Tehran court
entered a $500 million judgment against the U.S. See id.
192. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 126, at 534.
193. In reference to releasing foreign frozen assets in order to pay victims' judgments a State
Department official commented: "Any choice to give up assets is a choice to give up
leverage ....It's a choice to give up the entire public's interest to compensate an individual."
Schleifer, supra note 136.
194. See Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 126, 518 n. 113 ("President Clinton exercised his waiver
authority the day he signed the bill into law, and there is no indication that this situation will change
under the Bush Administration.").
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Iran.' 95 However,
this time the burden on the American taxpayers may be
196
too much.

C. Correctingthe Injustice

"Members of the public are likely to feel that, after the government
has granted the right to sue, compensation should be provided by the
country responsible for sponsoring the acts of terrorism and not by
American taxpayers."' 97 This is a perfectly logical expectation. However,
with the case of Iraq as a defendant this is not an option."
It is time to break away from the dangerous precedent set by the
enactment of the JVTA in the past.' 99 No additional legislation should be
passed in the future to authorize the payment of compensatory damages,
by the U.S. Treasury Department, to victims of terrorism who are
awarded judgments against Iraq.2m° This may sound harsh, but it is
195. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
196. For example, Americans are already facing a down economy. See Betsy Stark, Tallying
the Cost of War, (Mar. 21 2003) at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/business/WorldNewsTonight.
Not to mention the recent wartime supplemental budget President Bush submitted to Congress to
help pay for the war. See President Submits Wartime Budget (Mar. 25, 2003),
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030325-2.The President requested $74.7
billion. See id. The supplemental request is to pay for the military in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
the global war on terrorism, humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people, and Ht~meland Security. See
Supporting Our Troops Abroad and Increasing Safety at Home (Mar. 25, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/O3/20030325.html(explaining in detail the items the
wartime supplemental budget will support). Although judgments against Iraq will not be awarded
any time soon, the war and rebuilding Iraq is something taxpayers will be paying for long into the
future. See Stark, supra. Paying the judgments entered against Iraq may put some taxpayers over the
edge.
197. Gartenstein-Ross, supra note 126, at 520. Interestingly, not all plaintiffs from previous
lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism feel better after being awarded a judgment. For example,
Stephen Flatow, who sued Iran under the terrorism exception for the murder of his daughter in
1995, commented "victory brought little comfort." Schleifer, supra note 136; see supra Part IV.B. I
(discussing Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran). "'People are going to be looking for closure in any
way possible, but let me tell you, there is no such thing' . . . [t]hat's a lesson that the government
and taxpayers may soon be paying for other victims' families to learn." Schleifer, supra note 136.
198. See supra Part VI.B.
199. See Susan Cohen & Daniel Cohen, Victims Won't Take Money from U.S. Taxpayers,
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 26, 2000, at 1IB
This bill is not anti-terrorism legislation; it's an evasion. And it sets a precedent that will
haunt us for years to come. Given current political conditions, there are bound to be a lot
more American victims of international terrorism. One can almost hear the lawyers
salivating, now that our government is acting as a guarantor for terrorist nations ordered
by American courts to pay their victims.
Id.
200. Unlike the remedy created with respect to the collection of certain judgments against Iran,
a similar solution is not feasible in this case. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. In
Count Six of the CMC the plaintiffs request $50 million for each plaintiff in compensatory damages
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necessary in order to protect the American taxpayers. In addition, the
plaintiffs in this lawsuit must realize that the United States government
has the same objective as they do, to put an end to terrorism.
Furthermore, they must realize that a victory for the United States
against Iraq is also a victory for the plaintiffs; therefore, the plaintiffs do
not need to actually collect their judgment to accomplish their goal.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The issue of terrorism lawsuits is an extremely emotional one. "The
pain of the families who have lost loved ones in terrorist attacks and
their right to seek compensation for their loss cannot be denied."'0 '
However, taking on Iraq as a defendant will not yield the results these
plaintiffs desire. The reality is that the American taxpayers are going to
pay for the wrongs of Iraq unless the victims forego enforcing the
judgments entered against Iraq.
Donna M. Balducci*

alone, against Iraq, Iran, and Sudan, and their instrumentalities and agents. See CMC, supra note
145, at 261-63. If the court were to award this amount, in a conservative estimate Iraq alone would
be liable for approximately $21 billion. This figure indicates Iraq will be liable for about $15
million for each plaintiff. Precedent demonstrates that this figure is in line with other judgments in
similar cases. See supra Par IV. Even if a formula were created which reduced this figure by half it
still is an incredible amount of money. Not to mention, this is not considering other civil cases that
may be brought against Iraq under the terrorism exception.
201. Schleifer, supra note 136.
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